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I. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF $88,911.67 IN
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD BE REVERSED.
Prior to December 5, 1980 (the date the principal and
interest on the Promissory Notes was paid in full) plaintiffs
were attempting to recover two debts, the $119,000 due on the
Promissory Notes (for which attorney fees were recoverable) and
the $4 9,966.21 due on the Assignment of Contract (for which
attorney fees were not recoverable.)

As to attorney fees

incurred by plaintiffs prior to December 5, 1980, plaintiffs
failed to allocate between attorney fees attributable to
collection of each debt. Only those allocable to collection of
the Promissory Notes were recoverable.

In their analysis,

plaintiffs failed to recognize this distinction.
As to attorney fees incurred after December 5, 1980, the
primary debt that plaintiffs were then trying to collect was the
$49,966.21 due on the Assignment of Contract since all principal
and interest on the Promissory Notes had been paid.

Attorney

fees were not recoverable for that debt since the Assignment of
Contract did not include an attorney fees clause.
There were some unpaid attorney fees that had been incurred
in collection of the Promissory Notes prior to December 5, 1980
that were still owed.

However, those fees were relatively minor

1

(less than $5,000.)

Furthermore, the Promissory Notes did not

allow for recovery of attorney fees incurred in the collection of
those attorney fees.

The Promissory Notes only allow for

recovery of costs and attorney fees for the recovery of the
unpaid principal and interest due under the Promissory Notes.1
As of December 5, 1980, there was no principal and interest due
under the Promissory Notes since all principal and interest had
been paid in full.

Accordingly, after December 5, 1980 no costs

and attorney fees could have been incurred for recovery of unpaid
principal and interest.
Once all principal and interest on the Promissory Notes was
paid in full on December 5, 1980, there was no further basis for
plaintiffs to recover any costs and attorney fees thereafter
incurred by plaintiffs for any reason, except costs and attorney
fees "incident to" the April 29, 1994 nonjudicial trustee's sale

lr

The Promissory Notes provide:

In the case of default in the payment of any
installment of principal or interest as herein
stipulated, then it shall be optional with the legal
holder of the note to declare the entire principal sum
hereof due and payable; and proceedings may at once be
instituted for recovery of the same [i.e., recovery of
principal and interest] by law, with accrued interest
and costs, including reasonable attorney's fees.
(R. at 469) (emphasis added).
2

(to the extent that sale was valid.) 2
Plaintiffs cite Section 506 of the Bankruptcy Code as an
alternate basis for recovery of attorney fees, but that section
only allows recover of attorney fees if "provided for under the
agreement under which such claim arose:"
[T]here shall be allowed to the holder of such claim,
interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs
or charges provided for under the agreement under which
such claim arose.
11 U.S.C. Section 506(b).
As discussed above, recovery of attorney fees is not provided for
at all under the Assignment of Contract (for recovery of the
$49,966.21 advance) and is only provided for under the Promissory
Notes for recovery of principal and interest.
Plaintiffs emphasize that "all amounts expended in the
bankruptcy proceedings were necessary to protect Timm's security
interest."

(Appellee's Brief at page 19.) That may be true,

however, there must still be a legal basis to recover attorney
fees incurred in "protecting Timm's security interest."
Furthermore, the reason plaintiffs were trying to "protect" their
"security interest" in the Dewsnup property in the bankruptcy
proceeding was to use that property to collect on the $49,996.21
2

As discussed in Appellant's Brief, under paragraph 16 of
the Trust Deed plaintiffs would have been able to recover all
"costs and expenses incident to" the April 29, 1994 foreclosure,
including attorneys fees. See Appellant's Brief, page 23-24.
3

debt due under the Assignment of Contract.

There was no attorney

fees provision in the Assignment of Contract.

There was no legal

basis to award plaintiffs attorney fees for "protecting" their
"security interest" in the Dewsnup property.
Plaintiffs next argue that "Dewsnup's interpretation would
completely eviscerate the value of a contract provision for
attorney fees."

(Appellee's Brief, page 19.) This is not true.

The Assignment of Contract contains no contractual provision
providing for recovery of attorney fees.

The Promissory Notes

only allow for recovery of attorney fees incurred in the recovery
of principal and interest on the Promissory Notes.

Mrs. Dewsnup

is only asking the Court to interpret the contracts as they were
drafted.
In any event, Plaintiffs are estopped from claiming more
than $50,530.76 in costs and attorney fees.

At the time of the

foreclosure sale, Mrs. Dewsnup requested from plaintiffs "the
entire amount" of attorney fees and costs that plaintiff claimed
were due and owing.
$50,530.76.

The figure provided by plaintiffs was

At the hearing held six years later (November 13,

2000), that figure jumped to $88,911.67.
At the end of plaintiffs answers to interrogatories
plaintiffs did state that "[t]his figure does not include
attorneys fees and costs incurred after April 1, 1994, nor does
4

it include attorneys fees expended by Plaintiffs between April
29, 1981, and March of 1987."

However, the figure given by

plaintiff as the "entire amount" of attorney fees due and owing
was $50,530.76.

Plaintiffs have waived and/or are estopped from

claiming any fees in addition to the $50,530.76 figure given.

If

plaintiffs claimed additional attorney fees, they should have
stated what they were at the time of the foreclosure sale.

Mrs.

Dewsnup had a statutory right to rely on the figure provided by
plaintiffs in exercising her right to cure under Sections 57-1-31
and 57-1-40.

Plaintiffs cannot give Mrs. Dewsnup one figure at

the time of the sale, and then six years later, when it suits
their purpose, provide a different (and much higher) figure.
Finally, on April 24, 1992, the Dewsnups paid $3,362.37 to
plaintiffs.

In Appellees' Brief, plaintiffs do not dispute that

Mrs. Dewsnup was not given credit for this payment against any
costs and attorney fees that may have been due and owing.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEWSNUPS' MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A.

Mrs. Dewsnup is Entitled to Summary Judgment Because
the Nonjudicial Foreclosure Sale Violated the "OneAction" Rule

Plaintiffs argue that the nonjudicial foreclosure sale does
not violate the one-action rule since that rule applies to debts
secured "solely by mortgage upon real estate" and in this case
5

the "Dewsnup's debt on the Promissory Notes was secured by a
Trust Deed, water rights and Dewsnup's assigned interest in the
Arrow Contract."

(Appellees' Brief, page 35). The "Arrow

Contract" (an installment sales contract) has been treated as a
mortgage upon real property in other jurisdictions.
v. Anthony, 712 P.2d 678 (Idaho 1985).

See Quintana

Furthermore, water rights

are "real property." Therefore, all three instruments (the Trust
Deed, Assignment of Contract and security interest in water
rights) constitute a "mortgage" upon "real property."

Even if

those assets were construed as "mixed collateral," the one-action
rule should still apply.

See Real Property Collateral: The One-

Action Rule in Action, 1991 Utah Law Review, 557, 576-77, David
Millner.

("Both the language of UCC Section 9-501(4) as adopted

in Utah and understanding of the Utah State Bar Committee,
however, indicate that the rule continues to apply to any
foreclosure involving real property.") (Emphasis in original.)
Plaintiffs argue that the Dewsnup bankruptcy "bars
application" of the one-action rule. Plaintiffs offer no
authority to support this position and counsel for Mrs. Dewsnup
is unaware of any such authority.
Finally, plaintiffs argue that Mrs. Dewsnup has waived the
right to raise the one-action rule as a defense.

Plaintiffs now

claim that the issue should have been raised as early as 1980.
After the April 29, 1994 nonjudicial trustee's sale was held,

6

Mrs. Dewsnup promptly raised this issue before the trial court.
The trial court addressed the issue on the merits and did not
find the issue to have been untimely raised.

The issue was

timely raised and considered below and is properly before this
Court on appeal.
Plaintiffs elected to proceed by filing a Complaint to
recover the $119,000 due under the Promissory Notes, the
corresponding costs and attorney fees and the $4 9,966.21 due
under the Assignment of Contract.

The principal and interest due

on the Promissory Notes was paid in full and plaintiffs obtained
a Judgment for the $49,966.21 due under the Assignment of
Contract and $6,985.00 in costs and attorney fees.

Having done

so, plaintiffs must foreclose through judicial (pursuant to Rule
69 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure) and cannot thereafter
commence a nonjudicial foreclosure for the same debt for which a
Judgment has been obtained.
B.

The Dewsnups Are Entitled to Summary Judgment Because
the Noniudicial Foreclosure Sale was Barred by the
Statute of Limitations

As discussed in Appellant's Brief, plaintiffs are estopped
from claiming that the statute of limitations for commencing a
nonjudicial foreclosure was "tolled" as of 1988 inasmuch as
plaintiffs filed a Notice of Default to commence their
nonjudicial foreclosure on August 29, 1988.

7

In response to this,

plaintiffs attempt to switch theories, now arguing for the first
time that it was Mrs. Dewsnups' Motion to Stay (filed in 1989)
that tolled the statute of limitation.

Plaintiffs offer no case

law or other authority to support this theory.

The Order to Stay

was issued by Judge Thomas Green, United States District Court,
and did not stay the statute of limitation, either expressly or
implicitly.

Mrs. Dewsnup posted a $10,000 bond which the Court

held would compensate plaintiffs for any damages as a result of
the stay.

That bond was subsequently released to pay unpaid

property taxes on the property and to plaintiffs.
Contrary to plaintiffs' claim, this issue was before the
trial court and the trial court addressed this issue on the
merits on pages 3-4 of its Memorandum Decision (R. 916-17.)

At a

minimum this defense gave rise to issues of fact that required an
evidentiary hearing on whether the statute of limitations had
been tolled.

The trial court erred in dismissing this defense

without a hearing and holding that, as a matter of law, Mrs.
Dewsnup had no statute of limitations defense.
C.

The Dewsnups Are Entitled to Summary Judgment Because
the Foreclosed Debt was Not Secured by the Trust Deed

At the time of the foreclosure sale, plaintiffs claimed in
answers to interrogatories that $222,814.62 in debt was secured
by the Trust Deed.

In the Trustee's Deed, plaintiffs recited

8

that the property was sold to plaintiffs at the foreclosure sale
for $115,000.00 in "partial satisfaction" of that debt.
Plaintiffs now claim that under Section 57-1-29 they paid "excess
proceeds" from the foreclosure sale to themselves as a "person
legally entitled to the proceeds."

Plaintiffs claim that because

they had a "judgment lien" for $49,966.21, plaintiff's could (and
did) pay the "balance" from the foreclosure sale to themselves as
the "person entitled thereto."
First, under Section 57-1-31 and 57-1-40 Mrs. Dewsnup had a
statutory right to cure the default and prevent the foreclosure
sale by paying the amount that was unpaid and secured by the
trust deed.

At most this would have been the portion of $5,000

representing unpaid attorneys fees at the time that the principal
and interest was paid in full on December 5, 1980, not
$222,814.62 as plaintiffs claimed at the time of the foreclosure
sale.

In particular, Mrs. Dewsnup had a statutory right to cure

the debt secured by the Trust Deed and avoid the foreclosure sale
without paying the $49,966.21 "judgement lien." This right was
denied her.
Second, at the foreclosure sale plaintiff did not pay to
themselves "excess proceeds" from the nonjudicial trustee's sale
in accordance with Section 57-1-29, as they now claim.

In

response to interrogatories, plaintiffs claimed that $222,814.62
9

was secured by the Trust Deed.

The Trustee's Deed states that

the Property was sold at the foreclosure sale to plaintiffs for
"$115,000.00 . . .

in partial satisfaction of the indebtedness

then secured by the Deed of Trust." (R. at 440. ) 3

Based on the

plain language in Trustee's Deed and the plaintiffs answers to
interrogatories, plaintiffs foreclosed on the Property for debt
that was not secured by the Trust Deed.

This Court has already

determined that the $49,966,21 debt, plus interest (which
constituted 166,835.56 of the $222,814.62) was not secured by the
Trust Deed.

See Timm II, 921 P.2d at 1388 (stating that "the

$49,966.21 . . . debt was not secured by the trust deed").
Plaintiffs claim that they paid themselves the balance pursuant
to Section 57-1-29 is not what actually happened.
Even assuming that plaintiffs had paid themselves the
"excess proceeds," they were not the "party entitled thereto."
The legal effect of plaintiffs' "judgment lien" had long since

3

The Trustee's Deed states:
The Trustee did, on April 29,1994, at 4:30 p.m. at the
Millard County Courthouse, sell, at public auction, to
the Grantees, the United Precision Machine and
Engineering Company Profit Sharing Trust, ABCO
Insurance Agency, Inc. and Joseph L. Henriod, as
Trustee for the Annette Jacobs Trust, the highest
bidders therefore, the property described below for the
total sum of One Hundred Fifteen Thousand Dollars
($115,000.00), in partial satisfaction of the
indebtedness then secured by the Deed of Trust.
(R. 440.)
10

expired under the eight year statute of limitations for enforcing
judgments.
w

See Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-22.

Plaintiffs

judgment lien" was created on April 24, 1981 and expired on

April 24, 1989, five years before the trustee's sale.
Finally, plaintiffs argue that because they were acting in
"good faith and reliance on a valid judgment" the foreclosure
sale was legitimate.

However, where the issue of whether a debt

is secured by a trust deed is being litigated, the creditor holds
a foreclosure sale on that debt at its own risk. Timm III, 1999
UT 105, HU14-15.
D.

The Dewsnups Are Entitled to Summary Judgment Because
Plaintiffs Failed to Mail the Dewsnups a Notice of
Default or a Notice of Sale

Plaintiffs' sole argument against voiding the trustee's sale
because of statutory noncompliance is that Mrs. Dewsnup "had
actual notice and attempted to block the sale."

The only reason

Mrs. Dewsnup had actual notice of the nonjudicial trustee's sale
is because she happened to read about it in the newspaper.

For

the reasons discussed in Appellant's Brief, a nonjudicial
trustee's sale that ignores all of the debtors statutory rights
is not valid.

At a minimum, Mrs. Dewsnup was prejudiced by not

having notice of the sale three months prior to sale to allow
time to contest the amount alleged to be secured by the Trust
Deed and to raise the funds necessary to cure any legitimate
11

default under the Trust Deed.
III. TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFFS7 MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This is the second time that Mrs. Dewsnup has appealed the
trial court's dismissal of her counterclaims on plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment.

In Timm IIIf this Court reversed

the trial court's dismissal of Mrs. Dewsnup's counterclaims:
We therefore reverse the summary judgment in favor of
the lenders and the dismissal of Dewsnup's counterclaim
and remand the case to the trial court to address the
merits of the Dewsnup's claim for the wrongful
foreclosure of the trust deed property and the other
claims and defenses alleged in the counterclaim.
Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381 (Utah 1996.)
The facts and issues in plaintiffs' first Motion for Summary
Judgment are the same facts and issues raised in plaintiffs'
second Motion for Summary Judgment.

(See R. at 448-49.)

The

fact that Mrs. Dewsnup did not specifically state again all
issues and facts that were already on file in responding to
plaintiffs second Motion for Summary Judgment does not mean that
these facts and issues were not before the trial court -- they
were.

The trial court is presumed to have notice of the entire

file and the trial court was advised on at least one occasion by
counsel that the second Motion for Summary Judgment was basically
a renewal of the first.
Plaintiffs acknowledge in their brief that the trial court
12

ruled on these issues prior to Timm III -- "[t]he trial court in
this matter has already considered these matters and previously
made specific findings regarding her allegation before Timm III."
(See Appellee's Brief, page 42.)

The previous* trial court ruling

dismissing Mrs. Dewsnup's Counterclaims was reversed in Timm III,
and for the same reasons the trial court's ruling dismissing Mrs.
Dewsnup's counterclaims should be reversed again.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Attorney fees incurred by plaintiffs prior to December 5,
1980 must be allocated between collection of the principal and
interest due on Promissory Notes and the collection of $49,996.21
advance.

Only attorney fees incurred in collection of the

principal and interest due on the Promissory Notes are
recoverable.

After December 5, 1980 (the date all principal and

interest on the Promissory Notes was paid in full), there was no
legal basis to recover attorney fees except for attorney fees
that were "incident to" the April 29, 1994 foreclosure sale.
Mrs. Dewsnup is entitled to summary judgment on her claim
for wrongful foreclosure because the sale violated the "one
action" rule and was barred by the statute of limitations.
Plaintiffs also foreclosed on Trust Deed for debt not secured by
the Trust Deed.

Furthermore, plaintiffs failed to mail Mrs.

Dewsnup a notice of default and notice of sale as required by
13

law.
In addition, the trial court erred in granting Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment because a dispute of material fact
exists regarding Mrs. Dewsnups' counterclaims. ' All of those
issues were before the trial court prior to Timm III.

This Court

held in Timm III that those counterclaims should not have been
dismissed and the Timm III ruling in connection with those
counterclaims should be reinstated.
DATED this 6th day of May, 2002.

Russell A. Cline
Attorney for Appellant
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